Sales Excise Taxes

confidence: high · 17 sources

⚠
Working research — not a recommendation.

This page records what the evidence says a policy does, not what anyone should do about it. It has been synthesized from the cited sources but has not been independently reviewed.

What the evidence says

The clearest, most consistent thread across these sources is that pass-through of an excise tax to the retail price is not a fixed fraction — it swings from well under 100% to well over 100% depending on product tier, tax design, and market structure. Cigarette taxes are under-shifted in economy-tier brands (pass-through of 0.956) and over-shifted in premium brands (1.140), with mid-price brands landing near complete pass-through (0.990); across the full price distribution, pass-through rises from 0.922 at the 5th percentile to 1.167 at the 95th. Alcohol taxes run 100–200% pass-through (a 10-cent tax increase yields a 10–20 cent price rise). Sports-betting taxes pass through at 76% on average, but that average conceals a design effect: firms that shroud the tax (excluding it from the posted price) pass through 90%, while firms that post tax-inclusive prices pass through only 16%. E-cigarette tax pass-through ranges from 0.07 in China to 1.67 in the US, and in Indonesia and China taxes are sometimes absorbed by firms rather than passed to consumers at all. A 1926–1929 study of German food-staple taxes found the same spread historically: rye flour taxes over-shifted to 190% of the tax, wheat flour to 110%, while slaughter taxes on pork and beef under-shifted to 54% and 82% respectively.

On consumption, the evidence agrees on direction and disagrees only on size. Sugar-sweetened beverage (SSB) taxes decrease purchases of taxed beverages: a global panel estimates a price elasticity of −0.423, Philadelphia saw a 51% decline in taxed-beverage volume sales in the year after tax initiation, Mexico saw purchases fall 6% on average in 2014 (accelerating to 12% by December), and a set of studies compiled in one review found reductions ranging from 6.3% to 40%. Alcohol taxes decrease consumption with elasticities of −0.46 (beer), −0.69 (wine), and −0.80 (spirits), and an aggregate-level partial correlation of −0.44 across 24 studies (19 of 24 finding a relationship distinguishable from zero). Cigarette tax increases in a Serbian simulation decreased total packs sold by 4.7% in year one and 5.3% in year two, cut adult smoking prevalence from 37.9% to 35.8% over two years, and were projected to deter or delay smoking initiation in more than 17,000 youths. E-cigarette demand is comparatively inelastic (elasticity range −0.62 to −0.02 across studies), with taxes producing only a modest reduction in adult use (odds ratio 0.89) and use among 18–24-year-olds (odds ratio 0.87) in the three US studies available.

A second pattern in the SSB literature is substitution: taxes decrease purchases of the taxed product but increase purchases of untaxed substitutes and shift purchases to untaxed jurisdictions. In Mexico, untaxed-beverage purchases rose 4% (largely bottled water) alongside the decline in taxed beverages. In Philadelphia, sales fell inside the city but rose in neighboring counties by 1.14 million ounces per four-week period in supermarkets/grocery/mass-merchandiser channels and 33.0 thousand ounces in pharmacies; cross-border shopping is estimated to offset 25–30% of the total sales-reduction effect. This cross-border pattern is described as general across SSB tax evaluations, "with a few exceptions."

On transportation excise taxes, the evidence covers two distinct levers — fuel/VMT taxes and congestion pricing — and the distributional findings for each are contested or conditional rather than settled (see next section). What is not contested: current fuel tax revenue is described as inadequate to meet Highway Trust Fund infrastructure needs because of inflation and rising fuel efficiency; a revenue-neutral VMT fee would decrease the average tax paid per vehicle, and that decrease would grow further if VMT itself falls as gas prices rise; and the shift in burden for low-income drivers specifically under a VMT fee would be small — a decrease of less than one dollar for most groups.

The evidence is thin or entirely absent on several outcomes the topic invites questions about. No source here quantifies administrative or enforcement costs of any excise tax. The magnitude of "regressive or inequitable effects" of congestion pricing and low-emission-zone rules on commuters and carriers is stated but not sized. Long-run (multi-year) demand elasticity for SSBs is explicitly flagged as unknown — the Mexico estimates cover only the first year after the tax. And revenue from e-cigarette excise taxes is described only as "small compared with traditional tobacco excise revenue," without a figure.

Where the evidence splits

Fuel tax regressivity is reported in opposite directions. One source states fuel and VMT taxes are regressive because the same per-mile or per-gallon cost applies to all taxpayers regardless of income, and a second finds that low-income drivers pay a higher percentage of their income in fuel taxes than non-low-income drivers even though they pay less in absolute dollars. A third source instead reports that "most studies suggest that fuel taxes are nearly proportional...in developed countries." The sources do not explain the disagreement — they draw on different literatures and datasets (a general policy review versus register-based data), but none directly addresses why the other finds a different baseline distribution.

Congestion pricing's distributional effect goes in different directions depending on the city and what happens to the revenue. A meta-analysis of Stockholm's system found no regressive effect, and progressive effects if revenue is invested in transit operation. A separate modeling exercise found Gothenburg's system is more regressive than Stockholm's, with all but the highest-income drivers losing more than they gain. This split is explained by the sources: it turns on the transit-reinvestment assumption and on features specific to each city's charge structure, not on a shared measurement disagreement.

SSB tax pass-through to retail prices was full (100%, exactly the tax amount) in Mexico but 68% in South Africa. The sources report these as findings from different countries without reconciling the gap, so the difference in market or country context is the only distinction the claims themselves supply.

E-cigarette tax pass-through goes from firms absorbing the tax entirely in Indonesia and China to producers over-shifting it (pass-through above 1.0) in several US markets. This one is explained in the sources: it tracks jurisdiction and tax structure — ad valorem tax designs produce lower pass-through and lower effective tax incidence (7 percentage points lower) than specific tax designs.

Thresholds and dose-response

The World Health Organization's recommended threshold for SSB excise taxes is a retail price increase of at least 20%; applying the global elasticity estimate (−0.423), a 20% price increase is projected to reduce global consumption by approximately 8.5%.

Cigarette tax pass-through moves monotonically with the brand's position in the price distribution: pass-through is 0.922 (under-shifting) at the 5th price percentile and rises to 1.167 (over-shifting) at the 95th percentile, with near-complete pass-through (0.990) in the mid-price segment.

Regional pass-through of fuel taxes is roughly 15 percentage points lower in the richest, wealthiest (highest house prices), most densely populated, and most urban areas compared with the opposite extremes on each measure; the resulting regional price disparities were mitigated over the following two to three years.

Tax structure sets a threshold on incidence: states applying ad valorem e-cigarette tax structures show tax incidence 7 percentage points lower than states applying specific tax structures.

Open empirical questions

Findings

Sugar-sweetened beverage taxes decrease purchases of taxed beverages

confidence — direction: highconfidence — magnitude: mediumconsensus: settled on direction; magnitude varies by country and study
mechanism
tax raises retail price; consumers respond along the price elasticity of demand
effect
global elasticity −0.423% per 1% price increase; Philadelphia −51% in year one; Mexico −6% average in 2014, accelerating to −12% by December 2014; cross-study range −6.3% to −40%; Ecuador: 10% price increase → 13.5% consumption decrease
conditions / moderators
regional elasticity varies — Europe −0.828, Americas −0.509; no measured effect in Africa, Eastern Mediterranean, Southeast Asia, or Western Pacific

Sugar-sweetened beverage taxes decrease consumption more among low-income households than middle- or high-income households

confidence — direction: highconfidence — magnitude: highconsensus: settled — both sources agree on direction
mechanism
not stated
effect
Mexico: low-SES households declined 9% on average in 2014 (up to 17% by December) versus 5.5–5.6% for middle/high-SES households; a separate six-study review found the greatest purchase reductions among low-income households
conditions / moderators
SES classification varies by study

Sugar-sweetened beverage taxes increase purchases of untaxed beverages and shift sales to untaxed jurisdictions

confidence — direction: highconfidence — magnitude: high (Philadelphia estimates); medium (general pattern)consensus: settled on direction
mechanism
substitution to untaxed products and cross-border shopping
effect
Mexico untaxed-beverage purchases +4% (36 mL/capita/day), mainly bottled water; Philadelphia neighboring counties: +1.14 million oz per 4-week period (supermarkets/grocery/mass merchandisers), +33.0 thousand oz per 4-week period (pharmacies); cross-border shopping offsets 25–30% of the total sales-reduction effect
conditions / moderators
general pattern across evaluations, "with a few exceptions" (Andreyeva et al. 2022)

Sugar-sweetened beverage taxes are passed through to retail prices

confidence — direction: highconfidence — magnitude: mediumconsensus: contested on magnitude
mechanism
producers/retailers raise shelf prices in response to the tax
effect
Mexico: full pass-through, prices +1 peso/L, exactly the tax amount; South Africa: 68% pass-through rate
conditions / moderators
varies by country/market — see "Where the evidence splits"

A sugar-sweetened beverage tax increased the share of reformulated lower-sugar beverages

confidence — direction: highconfidence — magnitude: highconsensus: thin — one study
mechanism
not stated
effect
South Africa: reformulated lower-sugar beverages increased from 5.2% to 17.1% of beverages post-tax; sugar intake decreased by 4.9 g per capita per day
conditions / moderators
single country cited, via a review citing the original study

Cigarette excise tax pass-through to retail prices varies by brand price tier, from under-shifting to over-shifting

confidence — direction: highconfidence — magnitude: highconsensus: settled — tier gradient consistent across model specifications
mechanism
tax pass-through differs by brand positioning in the price distribution
effect
economy tier: 0.956 pass-through (under-shifting); premium tier: 1.140 (over-shifting); mid-price tier: 0.990 (near-complete); across quantiles, pass-through rises from 0.922 (5th percentile) to 1.167 (95th percentile); slim products show weaker pass-through (coefficient −0.107) than non-slim products; Serbia: average prices +10% in 2024 and +11% in 2025
conditions / moderators
under-shifting in lower price quantiles intensifies during high illicit-trade periods (2018–2021)

Cigarette excise tax increases decrease cigarette consumption and smoking prevalence

confidence — direction: highconfidence — magnitude: mediumconsensus: settled on direction; single-country simulation
mechanism
price increase from tax reduces quantity demanded and smoking prevalence
effect
total packs sold −4.7% year 1, −5.3% year 2; adult smoking prevalence 37.9% → 36.9% → 35.8% over two years; youth smoking initiation deterred or delayed for over 17,000 individuals across age groups
conditions / moderators
simulation-based, depends on elasticity parameters applied to the Serbian market

Cigarette excise tax increases increase government tax revenue despite declining sales

confidence — direction: highconfidence — magnitude: highconsensus: settled within this simulation
mechanism
inelastic demand means revenue rises even as unit sales fall
effect
excise tax revenue +7.0% annually in both years; total market value +5.1% (2024) and +5.4% (2025)
conditions / moderators
depends on illicit market share remaining stable

Cigarette excise tax increases decrease smoking-attributable premature mortality

confidence — direction: mediumconfidence — magnitude: lowconsensus: thin — one simulation
mechanism
reduced smoking prevalence lowers subsequent mortality
effect
320 premature deaths avoided year 1, 678 year 2
conditions / moderators
depends on assumption that a fixed proportion of quitters avoid smoking-attributable mortality; no individual-level longitudinal mortality data used

Higher alcohol prices decrease alcohol consumption, with elasticity varying by beverage type and level of aggregation

confidence — direction: highconfidence — magnitude: mediumconsensus: settled — nearly all studies find an inverse relationship
mechanism
price/tax increase reduces quantity demanded
effect
beer elasticity −0.46; wine −0.69; spirits −0.80; aggregate-level partial correlation for total alcohol −0.44 (19 of 24 studies finding a relationship distinguishable from zero); aggregate-level effect (r = −0.44) larger than individual-level effect (r = −0.06)
conditions / moderators
effect size shrinks at the individual level because aggregation averages out individual variation

Alcohol excise taxes are over-shifted to consumer prices

confidence — direction: mediumconfidence — magnitude: mediumconsensus: thin
mechanism
not stated beyond pass-through observation
effect
pass-through of 100–200% (a 10-cent tax increase produces a 10–20 cent price increase)
conditions / moderators
authors note the underlying empirical evidence is "fairly limited"

E-cigarette excise tax pass-through varies widely by jurisdiction and tax structure

confidence — direction: highconfidence — magnitude: mediumconsensus: contested on magnitude; heterogeneity itself is agreed
mechanism
ad valorem versus specific tax design, and firm/market behavior, change how much of the tax reaches the consumer price
effect
pass-through range 0.07 (China) to 1.67 (US); ad valorem structures show lower pass-through and 7 percentage points lower tax incidence than specific-tax states; some US studies find overshifting (pass-through above 1.0), others find 0.43–0.59; Indonesia and China show tax absorption by manufacturers/retailers rather than pass-through
conditions / moderators
jurisdiction and tax design

E-cigarette excise taxes decrease use modestly among adults and young adults in the US

confidence — direction: mediumconfidence — magnitude: lowconsensus: thin
mechanism
not stated
effect
adult odds ratio 0.89 (95% CI 0.84–0.94); ages 18–24 odds ratio 0.87 (95% CI 0.78–0.98); demand generally inelastic (elasticity −0.62 to −0.02 across contexts)
conditions / moderators
based on three US studies only

E-cigarette excise taxes increase government revenue by a small amount relative to tobacco excise revenue

confidence — direction: highconfidence — magnitude: lowconsensus: thin
mechanism
not stated
effect
direction: increase; magnitude described only as small relative to traditional tobacco excise revenue; separately, affordability of e-cigarettes increased for all age groups from 2015–2021 despite rising e-liquid tax rates in many states
conditions / moderators
no studies identified on administrative costs

Sports betting excise tax pass-through depends on whether firms shroud the tax in the posted price

confidence — direction: highconfidence — magnitude: highconsensus: settled within this quasi-experiment
mechanism
shrouding (excluding the tax from the displayed price) versus tax-inclusive posting changes consumer price salience and pass-through
effect
average pass-through 76%; shrouding firms pass through 90%; firms posting tax-inclusive prices pass through 16%; tax-inclusive consumer prices increased about 3.8 percentage points after the reform
conditions / moderators
firm pricing/display strategy

The German sports betting excise tax generated more than 2.6 billion euros in cumulative revenue through 2020

confidence — direction: highconfidence — magnitude: highconsensus: settled — administrative data
mechanism
not stated
effect
≥2.6 billion euros collected, per administrative tax data
conditions / moderators
not established

Early 20th-century German specific taxes on food staples show heterogeneous over- and under-shifting by product

confidence — direction: medium-highconfidence — magnitude: mediumconsensus: thin — one historical study
mechanism
not stated beyond product-market differences
effect
rye flour tax: 190% of tax amount (overshifting); wheat flour tax: 110% (weak overshifting); pork slaughter tax: 54% (undershifting); beef slaughter tax: 82% (undershifting)
conditions / moderators
lack of local cattle price data prevents assessing backward shifting to producers for the slaughter taxes

Fuel and vehicle-miles-traveled (VMT) taxes are regressive across income

confidence — direction: highconfidence — magnitude: mediumconsensus: contested
mechanism
a flat per-mile or per-gallon rate applies regardless of income
effect
described as regressive; low-income drivers pay a higher percentage of income in fuel taxes than non-low-income drivers, despite paying less in absolute dollars
conditions / moderators
contested — see "Where the evidence splits"

Fuel taxes are nearly proportional across income in developed countries

confidence — direction: highconfidence — magnitude: mediumconsensus: contested
mechanism
not stated
effect
"most studies suggest that fuel taxes are nearly proportional...in developed countries"
conditions / moderators
contradicts the regressivity finding above — see "Where the evidence splits"

A revenue-neutral VMT fee produces a tax burden similar to the current gas tax, and decreases the average tax paid per vehicle

confidence — direction: highconfidence — magnitude: highconsensus: settled within this study
mechanism
not stated
effect
not significantly more regressive than the gas tax; average gas tax paid per vehicle decreases under a revenue-neutral VMT fee, and would decrease further if VMT falls as gas prices rise; low-income drivers' tax burden decreases by less than one dollar for most groups
conditions / moderators
North Carolina, 2009 NHTS data

Current gas tax revenue is inadequate to meet US transportation infrastructure funding needs

confidence — direction: highconfidence — magnitude: mediumconsensus: settled within this study
mechanism
inflation and increased fuel efficiency erode real per-mile revenue from a flat per-gallon tax
effect
insufficient funding for the Highway Trust Fund; magnitude not quantified
conditions / moderators
not established

Regional pass-through of fuel taxes decreases with income, wealth, density, and urbanization, increasing regressivity

confidence — direction: highconfidence — magnitude: highconsensus: settled within this study
mechanism
heterogeneous regional pass-through shifts the effective burden distribution
effect
pass-through rates fall as regional income, wealth (house prices), population density, and urbanization rise; pass-through is about 15 percentage points lower in the richest, wealthiest, densest, most urban areas versus the opposite extremes; disparities mitigate over the following two to three years
conditions / moderators
these regional differences are described as tilting fuel taxation toward a more regressive direction overall

A VMT tax decreases the tax burden for drivers of fuel-inefficient vehicles, which may shift some drivers toward less efficient vehicles

confidence — direction: highconfidence — magnitude: lowconsensus: contested/mixed within the cited literature
mechanism
the VMT tax's cost-per-mile is typically less than the current gas-tax-per-mile cost for inefficient vehicles, changing relative incentives
effect
increased utility for drivers of inefficient cars under a VMT tax; a VMT tax may reduce overall driving while also creating a substitution effect toward fuel-inefficient vehicles or more driving among those drivers
conditions / moderators
mixed evidence — net effect on fleet efficiency not established

Congestion pricing has no measured regressive effect, and may have progressive effects, when revenue funds transit

confidence — direction: highconfidence — magnitude: mediumconsensus: contested
mechanism
revenue reinvestment in transit operation offsets the direct toll cost for lower-income groups
effect
a 2014 meta-analysis of four Stockholm studies found no regressive effects, and progressive effects on the distribution of costs and benefits, assuming revenue funds transit
conditions / moderators
conditional on the transit-reinvestment assumption; contradicted by the Gothenburg finding below — see "Where the evidence splits"

Gothenburg's congestion pricing system is more regressive than Stockholm's

confidence — direction: highconfidence — magnitude: highconsensus: contested — see "Where the evidence splits"
mechanism
not stated
effect
all but the highest-income drivers in Gothenburg lost more than they gained from the congestion charge
conditions / moderators
city-specific system design

Congestion pricing produces differential effects by gender and geography

confidence — direction: highconfidence — magnitude: mediumconsensus: settled within this study
mechanism
unequal access to exempt company cars by gender; geographic proximity to the cordon and to transit
effect
men, the wealthy, and Central Stockholm residents bear the greatest direct costs; women suffer greater average losses than men despite crossing the cordon at equal rates, because men have greater access to exempt company cars; residents immediately outside the cordon pay the most in fees, while residents to the north/west of the cordon (a low mean-income area) suffer the greatest net losses; transit revenue spending benefits women and lower-income individuals most
conditions / moderators
Stockholm-specific

Middle-income travelers reported feeling more adversely affected by congestion pricing than other income groups

confidence — direction: highconfidence — magnitude: lowconsensus: thin
mechanism
not stated (perception-based)
effect
middle-income travelers, as a group, felt they were adversely affected by the Stockholm congestion charge (ALS)
conditions / moderators
self-reported perception, not a modeled financial distribution

Congestion pricing increases delivery costs for carriers unable to shift delivery timing

confidence — direction: highconfidence — magnitude: low to mediumconsensus: settled within this review
mechanism
freight trips are often non-discretionary and delivery windows are set by receivers, limiting carriers' ability to avoid congestion-charge hours
effect
increased compliance costs for carriers unable to make off-peak deliveries; congestion pricing and related schemes (LEZs, off-peak delivery rules) can produce regressive or inequitable effects on commuters and carriers, magnitude unspecified
conditions / moderators
carrier flexibility in delivery timing

Vehicle and travel exemptions decrease the regressive impact of congestion pricing, but excessive exemptions decrease its effectiveness and transit revenue

confidence — direction: highconfidence — magnitude: mediumconsensus: settled within this review
mechanism
exemptions reduce the financial penalty for low-income commuters and small businesses, but if too many vehicles are exempted, the incentive to reduce driving and the revenue base both shrink
effect
exemptions minimize regressive impacts on low-income commuters and small businesses; excessive exemptions can incentivize vehicle use, sustain congestion, and reduce revenue raised for public transit investment
conditions / moderators
depends on the share of vehicles exempted

Modal shift from cars to buses shows no measured difference across income groups

confidence — direction: highconfidence — magnitude: mediumconsensus: thin — one study
mechanism
not stated
effect
no measured difference; 25% of low-income residents surveyed switched to buses
conditions / moderators
survey data, single study

Electric vehicle discounts disproportionately benefit higher-income households

confidence — direction: highconfidence — magnitude: mediumconsensus: thin — one study
mechanism
not stated
effect
EV discounts increase benefits to high-income households; described as decreasing system efficiency
conditions / moderators
not established

Some low-income individuals accept higher transportation costs, including congestion tolls, when they perceive a current or future benefit

confidence — direction: highconfidence — magnitude: lowconsensus: thin — one study
mechanism
not stated
effect
willingness to endure higher auto-ownership or toll costs tied to perceived benefit
conditions / moderators
qualitative sample

Cost-management strategies that low-income households use to cover transportation-related tax costs produce negative effects on those households

confidence — direction: mediumconfidence — magnitude: lowconsensus: thin — one study
mechanism
not stated
effect
negative effects from coping strategies, magnitude unspecified
conditions / moderators
not established

A tax on high-fat foods decreases household resources of low-income families relative to other income groups

confidence — direction: highconfidence — magnitude: lowconsensus: thin — one study
mechanism
flat consumption tax falls hardest, as a share of income, on low-income households
effect
regressive distribution; tax incidence felt hardest by low-income families
conditions / moderators
not established

Subsidy programs for healthy foods distribute the largest benefits to low-income earners

confidence — direction: highconfidence — magnitude: lowconsensus: thin — one study
mechanism
not stated
effect
progressive distribution; largest benefits accrue to low-income earners
conditions / moderators
contrasted directly with the fat-tax finding above, by the same source